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Abstract: 
In random key predistribution techniques for wireless sensor networks, a relatively small number of keys are 
randomly chosen from a large key pool and are loaded on the sensors prior to deployment. After deployment, 
each sensor tries finding a common key shared by itself and each of its neighbors to establish a link key to 
protect the wireless communication between themselves. One intrinsic disadvantage of such techniques is that 
some neighboring sensors do not share any common key. In order to establish a link key among these 
neighbors, a multihop secure path may be used to deliver the secret. Unfortunately, the possibility of sensors 
being compromised on the path may render such an establishment process insecure. In this work, we propose 
and analyze the Just-Enough Redundancy Transmission (JERT) scheme that uses the powerful Maximum-
Distance Separable (MDS) codes to address the problem. In the JERT scheme, the secret link key is encoded in 
(n; k) MDS code and transmitted through multiple multihop paths. To reduce the total information that needs to 
be transmitted, the redundant symbols of the MDS codes are transmitted only if the destination fails to decode 
the secret. The JERT scheme is demonstrated to be efficient and resilient against node capture. One salient 
feature of the JERT scheme is its flexibility of trading transmission for lower information disclosure. 
Index Terms—Wireless sensor networks, key predistribution, security, secret link key, symmetric key, 
maximum-distance separable codes. 
 
Article: 
1 INTRODUCTION 
WIRELESS Sensor Networks (WSNs) have attracted significant interest from the research community due to 
their potentials in a wide range of applications such as environmental sensing, battlefield sensing, and hazard 
leak detection. The security problem of these WSNs are important, as the sensors might be deployed to 
unfriendly areas. When any of the sensors is compromised or captured, the information on the sensor is 
disclosed to the adversary, and its operation may be controlled by the adversary. 
 
In order to secure the communication between a pair of sensors, a unique key is needed. Since public/private 
(asymmetric) keys require significantly more computation than secret (symmetric) key techniques, the latter is 
preferred in WSNs [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. In addition to the computation cost, public/private key techniques 
are based on the existence of a Certificate Authority (CA), but such CAs may be unavailable in WSNs. The 
distribution of a secret key for every possible communication link is nontrivial due to the large number of 
sensors and the limited onboard memory size. To this trend, key predistribution techniques have been proposed 
and studied [1], [2], [3], [4]. These techniques allow the sensors to randomly pick a relatively small number of 
keys from a large key pool, and two neighboring nodes
1
 then try finding a common key that is shared by 
themselves. 
 
In some WSNs, some nodes need to communicate with each of their neighbors, such as the cluster heads in the 
cluster-based WSNs [7]. Therefore, in order to secure all these communication, a key needs to be shared by 
such a node with each of its neighbors. Due to the randomness of the key selection process in key 
predistribution, some communication links do not have any common key. In [2], a secret link key delivery 
technique using a multihop secure path was proposed: one of the neighboring nodes finds a multihop secure 
path toward the other node. Each pair of neighboring nodes on the secure path share at least a common key, 
which could be different throughout the path. Then, a secret link key is generated from the source node and sent 
toward the destination through the secure path. The small geographical separation between the source and the 
destination enables prompt acknowledgment and efficient secret verification. 
 
Such a multihop secure path scheme works quite well when none of the nodes on the path is compromised and 
all sensor nodes forward the secret key honestly. However, the scheme has security problems if any of the nodes 
is compromised or captured by the adversary. Such a compromise affects the multihop secure path scheme in 
the following way: 1) since the secret link key is decrypted and reencrypted by each sensor on the path, it may 
be disclosed to the adversary and 2) the adversary can modify or drop the information passing through. 
 
In this work, we address the problem of compromised sensors modifying and eavesdropping on the secret 
information on such multihop paths. We use the powerful Maximum-Distance Separable (MDS) codes to 
develop the Just-Enough Redundancy Transmission (JERT) scheme to provide protection for information 
delivery. In the JERT scheme, the secret link key is encoded in (n; k) MDS code and transmitted through 
multiple multihop paths. To reduce the total information that needs to be transmitted, the redundant symbols of 
the MDS codes are transmitted only if the destination fails to decode the secret. Since paths with different hop 
counts may be compromised with different probabilities, we further differentiate the number of symbols sent 
through these paths. One salient feature of the JERT scheme is its flexibility of trading transmission for lower 
information disclosure. Our analysis and simulation results show that the proposed technique is highly efficient 
and resilient against node capture. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we overview related work. The secret link key delivery 
problem is formulated in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, we present the JERT scheme and our analysis. The 
performance evaluation results are provided in Section 6. We summarize and conclude this work in Section 7. 
 
2 RELATED WORK 
Eschenauer and Gligor [1] proposed a random key establishment technique for WSNs. In this technique, each 
sensor is preloaded a number of keys that are randomly selected from a large key pool. After deployment, two 
neighbors can establish a secure communication if they share a common key. Otherwise, they need to exchange 
a secret key via a multihop secure path. Chan et al. [2] extended the technique into q-composite random key 
establishment technique, which forces two neighbors to establish a secure communication only when they share 
q common keys, where q  2. Based on [1], two similar random key predistribution techniques that used 
multispace key pool to improve network resilience and memory usage efficiency were developed independently 
in [3] and [4]. 
 
A multipath key reinforcement technique was proposed in [2] to enable two nodes to establish secure 
communication, even if they do not share enough common keys (with the use of the q-composite technique). 
These two neighbors first identify all secure paths between themselves. Then, one node generates a set of 
random numbers (of the same size) for all the paths and sends one number to the other node through each of the 
paths. After the destination receives all the numbers, it exclusive-ORs all of them to obtain the secret link key. 
The multipath key reinforcement scheme significantly improves the protection of the secret link key from being  
                                                 
1
 In this work, we use “sensors,” “nodes,” and “sensor nodes” interchangeably. 
 
disclosed to the adversary. This scheme takes care of only information disclosure to the adversary but not 
information modification. It fails if any of the paths is compromised by the adversary and the number is 
modified or dropped. 
 
In [8] and [9], combinatorial set was used to distribute keys to sensors prior to deployment. Such a deterministic 
combinatorial set technique allows each key in the key pool to be assigned to a constant number of sensor 
nodes. Therefore, the number of nodes that each sensor shares a common key is fixed. 
 
A Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) was proposed in [10] to send additional information to protect routing 
information from being dropped. To combat the problem of topology instability in wireless networks, a 
multipath routing scheme was proposed and investigated in [11]. The scheme allows the sender to add extra 
overhead to each packet that is to be transmitted over multiple paths. The goal is to find the optimal way of 
fragmenting the packet into smaller blocks and delivering them over multiple paths. The focus of [10] and [11] 
is on the problem of missing some of the messages but not on the modification of them. 
 
In [12], an efficient information dispersal mechanism was developed to provide security, load balance, and fault 
tolerance for communication networks. The mechanism uses Reed-Solomon (RS) codes to recover link faults 
and to provide security. In this technique, all redundancy is sent along with the information symbols, increasing 
the transmission overhead significantly. 
 
RS codes were used in a similar way for the key establishment of WSNs by Huang and Mehdi [13]. The 
technique was proposed to combat Byzantine attacks on the multihop paths. With the use of the (n; k) RS codes, 
the proposed scheme is resilient to t = (n — k)/2 faulty paths, which may drop or alter the information sent 
through. Furthermore, the receiver can identify faulty paths, as long as their number is not greater than t. In this 
scheme, k(2t + 1) symbols need to be transmitted, limiting its applications of RS codes for large k or t.
2
 
Compared with [13], our scheme employs an efficient incremental information transmission technique that 
lowers the expected overall overhead significantly, and it can also be performed with RS codes of large k or 
large t. Extra symbols are transmitted only when they are necessary. We argue that with the source and the 
destination being direct neighbors, the cost of acknowledgment transmission is low. We further take advantage 
of the fact that different paths have different probabilities of being compromised or becoming faulty. Therefore, 
different amounts of symbols are sent through paths of different lengths in the JERT scheme. 
 
MDS codes have been used in the AutomaticτepeatRequest (ARQ) protocols to reduce the transmission over-
head on communication systems [16], [17]. In [16], RS codes were used in a type-2 hybrid ARQ protocol. In 
the first transmission, a relatively high rate RS code with fewer redundancy is used. When an additional 
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 The (n, k) codes are used to share secrets among n users, any k of which can recover the secret cooperatively. The Shamir scheme 
[14] is one of such schemes. As pointed out in [15], an RS code may be treated as a special (n, k) secret-sharing scheme with 
tamperτesistant capability, because it can correct errors. Also pointed out in the same work, the complexity of the decoding algorithm 
of the RS code is similar to that of the Shamir scheme. 
transmission is needed, only the redundant symbols are sent. With such a technique, the overall code rate is 
reduced. This scheme increases the system throughput by reducing the transmission overhead. In [17], 
punctured MDS codes were used for the type-2 hybrid ARQ protocol, and a modified version (with fewer 
decoding operations) of the scheme proposed in [16] was presented. 
 
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION 
We explain the link key establishment problem in WSNs in more detail in this section. The key predistribution 
schemes such as [1], [3], [4], and [18] provide memory-efficient and resilient ways of establishing secret link 
keys for a fraction of potential communication links. The rest of the communication links need to establish their 
secret keys by other means such as multihop delivery. 
 
A few sensor nodes are shown in Fig. 1. Each line segment connecting two nodes represents that these two 
nodes share at least a common key. For example, nodes E and F share at least a key. Note that nodes S and T do 
not share any common key. Now, assume that nodes S and T, which are physical neighbors, need to establish a 
secure communication that requires a secret link key. As suggested in [1], [2], and [3], in order to establish a 
secret link key between nodes S and T, a multihop secure path may be used to deliver the secret key. For 
example, node D may be used to relay the secret key between nodes S and T. Since only one multihop path is 
used in the key delivery, we term it the Single-Path (SP) scheme. 
 
The SP scheme may be summarized as follows: When node S needs to establish a secret link key Klink with 
node T, node S finds a path S — N1 — N2 — • • • — Nh — T, where S shares a key with N1, N1 shares a key 
(could be different) with N2,..., and Nh shares a key with T. Then, node S encrypts Klink with the secret key 
shared by itself and node N1 and sends the encrypted message to node N1. Node N1 decrypts Klink by using the 
common secret key shared with node S. Then, node N1 sends Klink to node N2 by using the same technique. This 
process continues until Klink reaches the destination, that is, node T. Some examples of such multihop paths in 
Fig. 1 are S — D — T, S—A—B—T, and S—E—F—G—T. 
 
In general, random key predistribution schemes such as [1], [3], [4], and [18] may experience some 
communication links being exposed when some sensors are compromised. This is because some keys are 
simply reused by other communication links. In the multihop path link key establishment process, the secret 
link key Klink is decrypted and then reencrypted by each of the sensor nodes on the multihop path. If 1) any of 
these sensors is compromised during the WSN initialization process or 2) the adversary is able to decrypt the 
recorded information after it compromises sensor nodes later on, such a secret link key Klink is exposed. A 
compromised sensor may modify or drop the secret information passing through in the multihop path key 
delivery process. This leads to the following problem: 
 
Problem statement. In key predistribution schemes for WSNs, some neighboring sensors do not share any 
common key. Their secret link key needs to be established through multihop secure paths. However, when any 
of the sensors on the multihop secure path is compromised or captured by the adversary, the secret link key is 
disclosed. A compromised sensor may also modify or drop the key information passing through itself. What 
fault-tolerant mechanism should we use to send the secret link key between two physical neighbors efficiently 
and securely? 
 
Note that we work on the problem of sending secret link key information between two neighbors that do not 
share a common key after the key predistribution process. Other security provisions such as authentication and 
confidentiality may be provided once the secret key is delivered but are out of the scope of this work. 
 
In Section 4, we introduce the powerful MDS codes and use them in our JERT scheme to solve this problem. 
 
4 THE JUST-ENOUGH REDUNDANCY TRANSMISSION SCHEME 
4.1 Variable Definitions 
For the sake of clarity and convenience for the readers, we list some major variables used throughout this paper: 
 
 n: the number of total symbols of the MDS code. 
 k: the number of information symbols of the MDS code (k < n). 
 γ: the length of secret link key (γ  k). 
 α: the threshold on the portion of information symbols being disclosed to the adversary. 
 β: a primitive element in a finite field that can  
represent all nonzero elements in the finite field. 
 t: the maximum number of errors (in symbols) that the MDS code can correct (t = L(n — k)=2J). 
 m: the number of available paths. 
 plocal: the connectivity probability (on security plane). 
 c = (c0, c1,  . . . ; ck—1 , ck , . . . ; cn—1): the code word of an (n, k) MDS code. 
 e: the maximum number of transmissions that the JERT scheme performs. 
 qj: the fraction of the total symbols that are being transmitted in each round on the jth path. 
 r1; r2; ... ; re: the number of extra symbols sent out by the source in each additional transmission. 
 r0 = k: the number of symbols sent out by the source in the first round of transmission. 
 hj: the hop count of the jth path. 
 x: the sensor node compromised probability. 
 nT: the number of total routers used by the JERT scheme. 
 xc: the number of compromised sensors on all of the multihop paths used by the JERT scheme. 
 L: the maximum number of hops of all multihop paths used by the JERT scheme. 
 mx: the number of compromised paths among the m available multihop paths. 
 px
(JERT)
 and px
(SP): 
the secret disclosure probabilities of the JERT scheme and the SP scheme, 
respectively. 
 δ(JERT) and δ(SP): the expected numbers of transmitted symbols of the JERT scheme and the SP scheme, 
respectively. 
 
4.2 Maximum-Distance Separable Codes 
We first review the MDS codes [16], [17] that will be used in the JERT scheme. Let the Hamming distance 
between two vectors (code words) be the number of distinct positions between two vectors. An (n; k; dmin) MDS 
code is a linear block code whose minimum Hamming distance dmin between any pair of distinct code words 
must satisfy dmin = n — k + 1, where n is the code length, and k is the dimension of the code. Therefore, each 
code word in the (n; k; n — k + 1) MDS code has exactly n symbols, among which there are k information 
symbols. Usually, the extra n — k symbols are called parity checks or the redundancy of the code. Furthermore, 
an (n; k; n — k + 1) MDS code will be able to recover any v errors if 
 
 
 
MDS codes are optimal in the sense that they provide the largest possible minimum Hamming distance between 
code words and hence can correct the most number of errors. The most famous family of MDS codes are RS 
codes. Efficient decoding algorithms for MDS codes have been studied extensively in [19] and [20]. In the 
following, we give a brief description of the encoder and the decoder of RS codes. 
 
 
Let GF(2
τ
) be the finite field of order 2τ such that each element in GF(2
τ
) can be represented by τ bits. An (n; k) 
RS code is a linear code, where each symbol is in GF(2
τ
), with the following parameters: 
 
 
 
where n is the total number of symbols in a code word, k is the total number of information symbols, and t is the 
symbol-error-correcting capability of the code. Let the sequence of k information symbols in GF(2
 τ
) be m = 
(m0;m1; ... ; mk—1) and let m(x) be the information polynomial of m represented as 
 
 
 
The code word polynomial c(x) corresponding to m(x) can be encoded as 
 
 
 
where g(x) is a generator polynomial of the RS code. It is well known that g(x) can be obtained as 
 
 
 
 
where β is a primitive element in GF(2
τ
), and gi  GF(2
τ
). Note that g(x) has β; β
2
;...;β
2t
 as roots. 
 
Another way of encoding c(x) is to use polynomial division as 
 
 
 
Since each symbol is represented by τ bits, an (n; k) RS code can be expanded to a (τn; τk) binary linear block 
code. For example, a (1,023,255) RS code with 384 symbolerror-correcting capabilities is of 10 x 255 = 2;550 
information bits. The computational cost of the encoder is roughly k(n — k) additions and k(n — k) 
multiplications.
3
 
 
The decoding processes of RS codes are more complex. Let r(x) be the received polynomial and let  r(x) = c(x) 
+ e(x), where  
 
 
 
is the error polynomial. Since g(x) (and, hence, c(x)) has β; β
2
;...; β
2t
 as roots, the syndromes Si can be calculated 
as 
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 3. Addition and multiplication are performed on GF(2
τ
), which can be implemented by a table lookup method. 
 
 
Assume that v  t errors occur in unknown locations j1; j2; . . . ; jv of the received polynomial. Then 
 
 
 
where eje is the value of the th error,  = 1; • • • ; v. The decoding process finds all  and eje. Instead of 
solving the set of the above 2t syndrome equations, an intermediate  polynomial, called the error-locator 
polynomial, is  introduced as 
 
The coefficients of the error-locator polynomial can be determined by the Berlekamp-Massy algorithm or 
euclidean algorithm that are of time complexity O(t
2
) [19], [20], [21]. Once all coefficients of the error-locator 
polynomial are found,  can be determined by successive substitution through the Chien search [21]. Finally, 
eje can be calculated by the Forney formula [21]. 
 
Each of the RS decoding processes can be implemented in either hardware or software. Hardware 
implementations with moderate/high speed but small/large hardware have been proposed [19], [20], [21]. 
Software implementation of the RS decoding process can be programmed on a general- purpose processor [21]. 
The first step in the decoding of an RS code is to compute the 2t syndromes. Combining with the Horner rule, 
this step requires (n — 1)t additions and nt multiplications. Finding the coefficients of the error-locator 
polynomial requires roughly 2t
2
 additions and 2t
2
 multiplications. In the worst case, the Chien search needs to 
substitute n field elements into the error-location polynomial of degree t to determine its roots. This requires nt 
multiplications and nt additions in the software implementation. The computational complexity of the Forney 
formula calculation, which is the final step of the decoding process, is similar to that of finding the coefficients 
of the error-locator polynomial. In total, (2n — 1)t + 4t
2
 additions and 2nt + 4t
2
 multiplications are needed to 
complete the decoding process. 
 
When the lookup table technique is implemented, the additions and multiplicationis on GF( ) have roughly the 
same complexity. Let β be a primitive element of GF( ) and all elements in this field can be expressed as 
powers of 0. Each multiplication calculation takes a modular addition of two exponents on  — 1. The addition 
calculation is implemented by the Zech logarithms [22] and takes one subtraction, one modular addition on  
— 1, and one memory access. The memory usage is then  bits to implement the Zech logarithms. For 
GF( ) used in our simulations, the memory required is only 1.25 Kbytes. 
 
MDS codes have several nice properties that make them very useful. Two of such properties are given as 
follows without proof: 
 
Property 1. Punctured (shortened) MDS codes are MDS. 
 
A code is punctured when some parity symbols are deleted from each code word in the code. Similarly, a code 
is shortened when some information symbols are deleted from each code word in the code. For instance, an (n; 
k; n — k + 1) MDS code can be punctured (shortened) to an (n — j; k; n — j — k + 1) (n — j; k — j; n — k + 1) 
MDS code by deleting j corresponding parity (information) symbols from each code word. 
 
Property 2. Any k-coordinates of an MDS code can be used as information symbols. 
 
According to this property, by knowing any k symbols of a code word in an MDS code, we can recover other n 
— k symbols for this code word. 
 
4.3 The Just-Enough Redundancy Transmission Scheme 
Let c = (c0; c1; . . . ; ck—1; ck; . . . ; cn—1) be a code word of an (n; k) MDS code over GF ( ), where ci   GF 
( ), 0  i  n — 1, is a symbol. Here, c0; ... ; ck—1 are the information that the source needs to send to the 
destination. Assume that the secret link key generated by the source is of length  k and can be generated by 
a function f of these information if the destination decodes the code word c correctly. The design goal of our 
scheme is to tolerate up to e compromised paths and to send as few symbols as possible. Since an (n; k) MDS 
code can recover up to (n — k)/2 errors, n should satisfy 
 
 
 
where v is the number of errors occurring on a code word, and we have implicitly assumed that n — k is even. 
 
In this work, we assume that the costs of all one-hop transmissions are the same. Therefore, the transmission 
overhead or cost of sending a packet through one path is proportional to its hop count. The unit of such a cost is 
[symbol • hop]. We neglect other extra costs such as MAC-layer headers and physical-layer headers. We argue 
that our transmission overhead analysis will hold, as long as the number of symbols being sent is large 
compared to these extra costs. 
 
In order to minimize such a transmission overhead and to simultaneously maximize the security protection of 
the scheme, the sender should send different numbers of symbols through different paths according to their hop 
counts. Assume that the sender transmits qj fraction of the total symbols that are being transmitted toward the 
destination in one round through path j, where 1  j  m, and . The values of qj, 1  j  m, affects the 
performance of our scheme. We will determine qj in Section 5.1. 
 
A brief outline of the JERT scheme is given as follows (see Fig. 2): Let r0 = k be the number of symbols sent by 
the source in the original transmission. If the destination receives all information correctly and regenerates the 
secret key sent by the source, our scheme terminates. Otherwise, the source sends r1 extra symbols in its first 
additional transmission. If the destination succeeds in the secret key regeneration, our scheme stops. Otherwise, 
the same process continues until the n symbols are exhausted. 
 
 
Let r1; r2; ... ; re be the numbers of extra symbols sent out by the source in each additional transmission (the 
values of ri, 1  i  e, will be determined in Section 5.2). Note that in our scheme, the source only needs to 
send out up to  symbols when tp paths are compromised.
4
 Let y = (y0; y1; . . . ; —1) be the 
corresponding received vector at the destination when the source has sent out  symbols up to now. 
 
The JERT scheme is given as follows: 
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 This is always true when qj = 1/m for all 1 j  m. For other values of qj, tp is the average result. 
 
1. The source first encodes k symbols, c0 = (c0; c1; ... ; ck—1), into a code word with n symbols, c = (c0; c1; 
... ; ck—1; ck; ... ; cn—1) ,
5
 where r0 = k. Initialize i=0,b=0,and s=ri—1. 
2. The source transmits qjri symbols specified by b and s in c, that is, ci = (cb; cb+1; ... ; cs), along path j for 
1 j  m. If qjri is not an integer, a round-off value will be used instead. 
3. Assume that the destination receives all symbols from the m paths as yi = (yb; yb+1; . . . ; ys)
6
  The 
destination appends yi to all the previously received symbols to form a longer code word. Then, it tries 
decoding this code word in order to obtain the k symbols. If the decode process fails due to more than i 
errors, then go to step 4 directly; otherwise, it verifies this result with the source through the challenge 
response technique (recall that the source and the destination are direct physical neighbors). If the 
regenerated secret link key is verified, the transmission of the secret link key has succeeded; otherwise, 
go to step 4. 
4. If i = e, then the key establishment fails due to too many compromised paths. Otherwise, the destination 
asks for another round of additional transmission. 
5. The source sets i = i + 1, b= s+1, and s = s + ri and repeats step 2. 
 
Therefore, compared with [16] and [17], which have only one additional transmission, the JERT scheme sends 
multiple retransmissions when necessary. 
 
Note that the JERT scheme does not need to know the identification of the compromised paths to decode the 
secret successfully. The MDS decoder at the receiver will automatically correct any modification by the 
compromised nodes in these paths and request for additional transmission when necessary. 
 
4.4 Multihop Paths 
Before we present our analysis of the JERT scheme, we discuss the path selection process and its effect on the 
performance of the JERT scheme. In this work, we assume that a source node identifies m multihop paths 
between itself and the destination. Such m paths could be chosen from the node-disjoint paths, in which none of 
the multihop paths shares any common node other than the source and the destination [23], [24], [25]. Another 
option is to allow the source node to randomly select among all available paths. The result is that some paths 
may have common nodes, and thus, the security performance worsens. The benefit of such a selection technique 
is that it does not rely on the availability of node-disjoint multihop paths and eliminates the cost of identifying 
such paths.
7
 
 
As suggested by Chan et al. [2], it is always beneficial to choose short multihop paths instead of long multihop 
paths. As the length of a multihop path increases, the possibility of path compromise is higher. As we limit 
ourselves to short multihop paths, however, the number of available paths may be limited. We evaluate the 
values of m under various network conditions and the effect of such m paths on the security performance of our 
scheme in Section 6. The proposed JERT scheme works with any set of multihop paths and node-disjoint 
multihop paths. 
 
5 ANALYSIS 
In this section, we derive formulas for the fractions of symbols to be transmitted through each path qj, 1 < j< m, 
and the number of additional symbols to be transmitted in each round ri, 0 < i < e, for the JERT scheme. We 
will also investigate three performance aspects of the JERT scheme and the SP scheme, which sends the secret 
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 Note that the first k symbols of the code word c do not have to be the same as c0, as our notation suggests. When they are different, 
the destination or an adversary needs to use a decoding function to regenerate the information symbols. This increases the operational 
complexity but slightly improves the system security. 
6
 The source can notify the destination regarding the number of transmitted symbols over plaintext (recall that the source and the 
destination nodes are direct physical neighbors). Therefore, the event of symbols being dropped is similar to that of symbols being 
modified along the multihop paths. 
7
 The procedure of establishing such secure paths is out of the scope of this paper. See [23], [24], and [25] for more details. 
link key through a single multihop path: secret information disclosure, transmission overhead, and computation 
overhead. 
 
5.1 Selection of q1; q2;... ; qm 
Due to the lack of the knowledge of which paths may be compromised, the source node has the best option of 
making sure that the expected number of symbols compromised on each path is more or less the same. 
 
Let hj be the hop count of path j, 1  j  m, and x the probability of nodes being compromised. Then, the prob-
ability that path j is compromised, given that the source and the destination are not compromised,
8
 is 
 
Pr [at least one router in between is compromised) 
the source and the destination are not compromised]  
= Pr [at least one router in between is compromised]  
= 1 — Pr [none of the routers is compromised] 
= 1 — (1 — x)
hj—1
; 
 
where 1  j  m. 
 
The expected number of symbols being compromised for path j is 
 
 
 
and the source node needs to make sure that 
 
 
Since , the constant C should satisfy 
 
 
When x is small, 
hj-1 may be approximated as 
 
 
 
 
Thus, we have derived a closed form for qj, 1   j  m, that is unrelated to x when x « 1. 
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 A compromised source or destination makes the key exchange meaningless. 
5.2 Selections of r1; r2;... ; re 
The values of r1; r2; ... ; re can be determined as follows: In order to reduce the total number of symbols to be 
transmitted, in each transmission, we should add as little redundancy as possible, which can correct errors due 
to one more compromised path. 
 
In general, when one round of the JERT scheme fails, the next round of transmission should provide the 
receiver just-enough symbols so that it can correct the errors due to one more compromised path. In our JERT 
scheme, however, each path transmits different amounts of symbols. Although this provides better security 
performance, such a transmission technique makes the determination of r1; r2; ... ; re rather complex. 
 
In this section, however, we determine r1; r2; ... ; re with the help of the average number of the symbols 
transmitted on all routes. Thus, we assume that in the next round of transmission, each route carries the same 
amount of information. This makes our analysis tractable. In Section 6, we will show the effectiveness of our 
simplified model. 
 
Let qavg be the average value of qjr, 1  j  m. Since =1, we have 
 
 
 
In the following, we derive a set of r1; r2; ... ; re such that when up to i — 1 rounds of transmission fail to allow 
the receiver to regenerate the secret link key, the ith round of symbol transmission corrects the errors caused by 
one more path, 0 < i  e. 
 
Since qavg = 1/m, by noticing that r1 symbols are added in order to correct the errors caused by one 
compromised path, we can determine r1 as 
 
 
 
The left side of (7) is the total number of errors introduced by the compromised path. The right side of (7) is the 
error correction capability due to the transmission of the additional r1 symbols. 
 
Taking the smallest integer that satisfies the above inequality, we have 
 
 
 
In general, the value of , where 1   e, must satisfy the following: 
 
 
In order to reduce the total number of symbols transmitted, we choose the smallest   that satisfies the above 
inequality. Therefore, 
 
 
Based on (10), when there are   compromised paths between the source and the destination, the total number of 
additional symbols that should be transmitted is 
 
With the help of (11), we can rearrange (10) as 
 
 
when 1   e. 
 
Since e is the maximum number of compromised paths that can be tolerated by the JERT scheme, the set of r1; 
r2; ... ; re should satisfy: 
 
 
which leads to (based on (11)) 
 
Therefore, e should satisfy 
 
 
 
As a point of reference, when n = 1;023, k = 255, and m = 15, the maximum value of e is 5 due to (13). The 
array ri, 0  i  e, is {255 40 53 77 122 218}. 
 
5.3 Information Disclosure 
We start our discussion on the security performance of information disclosure by presenting the attack model. 
An adversary takes control of some compromised sensors. The adversary may control the sensors to perform 
one of the following activities: 
 
1. Observing sensors. The compromised sensors may silently observe and record all the symbols 
that are passing through, but they do not modify these symbols. 
2. Modifying sensors. The compromised sensors may modify or drop the symbols that are passing 
through. 
3. Hybrid. A combination of the above two categories of sensors. Some sensors observe and record 
the secret information. Others modify or drop the secret information. 
 
An analysis of the third category of actions would be quite complex and is out of the scope of this paper. We 
focus on the first two categories of actions instead. In this section, we study the security problem caused by the 
observing sensors. 
 
Recall that x is node compromised probability, 0   x < 1. Let Pr[Ps2;s3;...;sL] be the probability of event S that 
the source and the destination find s2 paths with length (hop count) 2, s3 paths with length 3;..., and sL with the 
maximum length L (note that all these paths are secure multihop paths). Such a probability is dependent on the 
algorithm to search for the node-disjoint paths and will be discussed in 
 
 
 
Section 6. Since all found paths are node disjoint and m = s2 + • • • + sL, the total number of routers is 
 
 
 
We denote Bxc as the event that xc out of the nT routers are compromised. Based on an independent 
compromised probability x, the probability of event Bxc taking place is 
 
 
 
Let Amx be the event that mx among the m available paths are compromised by the adversary.
9
 Next, we evaluate 
Pr[Amx | Bxc S]. Let Dn2,…,nL be the event that the mx compromised paths contain n2 paths among the s2 paths 
with length 2;... and the nL paths among the sL paths with length L. When xc < mx, Pr[Amx | Bxc S] is zero, since 
it is impossible to have more compromised paths than compromised sensors when all paths are node disjoint. 
When xc  mx, 
 
 
 
where 0  ni  si for 2  i  L. 
 
Now, we need to derive Pr[Dn2 ;...; nL | Bxc S]. Assume that nj1; nj2;... ; njg, 0  g  L — 1 are the nonzero 
terms of n2; ... ; nL. Therefore, there are nj1 paths of length j1 compromised, nj2 paths of length j2 compromised, 
...; njg paths of length jg compromised. Then, we need to consider all possibilities to select xc compromised 
nodes from xn = (ji — 1) nodes on the mx compromised paths. Since all these mx paths are compromised, 
at least one node on each path must be compromised. Hence, 
 
 
where 1 -1 for 1  i  g. 
 
We now derive the secret disclosure probability px, which is defined as the probability of disclosing enough 
symbols to the adversary so that it can obtain the key with relative ease when the node-compromised probability 
is x. 
 
In the SP scheme, the symbols are transmitted through one randomly chosen path among the m available 
paths. If the SP scheme selects a compromised path to transmit, then all  symbols are revealed. Hence, when 
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 We use a different variable from e in order to distinguish the two different kinds of compromises: information modification and 
information disclosure.  
there are mx compromised paths, the secret disclosure probability is mx/m. The overall secret disclosure 
probability can be calculated as 
 
 
 
where nT is given by (14). 
 
When the JERT scheme is used, the source transmits only r0 = k symbols, and the destination gets all of these 
symbols successfully, because no information is modified. Such k symbols are transmitted through the m paths 
with qj fraction for path j, 1  j  m, where qj is given by (5). For fair comparison between the JERT scheme 
and the SP scheme, we define the secret disclosure probability of the JERT scheme as the probability of at least 
 symbols being disclosed to the adversary, where 0 <    1. Therefore, the secret disclosure probability can 
be calculated as 
 
 
 
where Eα is the event that the fraction of symbols transmitted through the compromised paths are greater than 
or equal to a and is given by 
 
 
 
where 0  ni  si for 2  i  L. Note the additional condition of Eα in (21) compared to (16). 
 
The value of α depends largely on how the γ symbols of the secret link key information are encoded into the k 
symbols. Therefore, it depends on the selection of function f in the scheme. 
 
5.4 Transmission Overhead 
In this section, we reuse some of the analysis in Section 5.3 to evaluate the transmission overhead (cost) of the 
JERT and the SP schemes. We assume that all compromised nodes modify the symbols passing through in our 
analysis in this section. 
 
For the SP scheme, only the  term in (18) needs to be modified in order to derive the transmission overhead. 
When there are mx out of m paths that are compromised, the chance of successful transmission in the first round 
is  . The chance of successful transmission in the second round is  . (recall that the sender 
randomly picks a path other than the failed path). The process continues until either the transmission becomes 
successful or all paths are found to be compromised. The expected extra number of transmitted symbols, given 
m and mx, is then 
 
 
 
where 1(mx < m) returns 1 when the condition mx < m is true; otherwise, it returns 0. 
 
Thus, the expected number of transmitted symbols of the SP scheme is 
 
 
where nT is given by (14), Pr[Amx | Bxc S] is given by (16), and δ
(SP)
 (m; mx) is given by (22). 
 
For the JERT scheme, a failed ith, 1  i < e, transmission leads to additional ri symbols to be transmitted. In 
order to simplify our analysis, we assume that when a path is compromised, the average number of symbols is 
modified (instead of the qj fraction of symbols transmitted through the path in the current round). Such a 
simplification makes our analysis tractable while maintaining its validity. 
 
When there are mx paths compromised, the JERT scheme sends a total of  symbols. Therefore, the 
expected extra number of transmitted symbols of the JERT scheme, given that mx out of m paths are 
compromised, can be expressed as 
 
where e is determined in (13). 
 
The expected number of transmitted symbols of the JERT scheme is 
 
 
5.5 Computation Cost 
In the proposed JERT scheme, punctured MDS codes are used to transmit extra symbols. Thus, the error-
erasure decoding algorithm must be implemented in order to decode the received vector efficiently [21], [26], 
[27]. Two extra decoding steps are needed for error-erasure decoding compared with the error-only decoding: 
the calculation of the erasure-locator polynomial and the computation of the Forney syndrome polynomial. For 
punctured codes, the calculation of the erasure-locator polynomial can be performed in advance such that no 
computation is needed. The Forney syndrome is obtained by multiplying the erasure-locator polynomial by the 
syndrome and then modularizing it by x
2t
. For an (n'; k) punctured MDS code with (n; k) mother code, the 
computation takes about (n — n')(n + n' — 2k — 3)/2 multiplications and additions. Determining the values of 
errors via the Forney formula is now more complex. One additional step is the error-locator polynomial 
multiplying the erasure- locator polynomial. The computations of the whole procedure to determine the values 
of errors is roughly 3(n — k + n — n')(n' — k)/8 + (n — n')(n' — k)/2 additions and multiplications. In total, for 
the punctured code, the total number of calculations is then 
 
In some applications, the available memory could be limited. Then, a direct software implementation on 
additions and multiplications is preferred. The complexity of additions is to take bitwise exclusive-ORs on two τ 
-bit vectors, and performing a multiplication is equivalent to performing τ additions. Thus, the total number of 
calculations is then 
 
It has been observed that the energy cost of transmitting 1 Kbit to a distance of 100 m is approximately 3 J. By 
contrast, a general-purpose processor with 100-MIPS/W power could efficiently execute 3 million instructions 
for the same amount of energy [28]. Based on these numbers, we can convert the extra computation cost of the 
JERT scheme into equivalent symbol transmissions. Assume that the JERT scheme performs tp < e round of 
extra transmissions. Using (26), we calculate the extra computation cost as equivalent to 
 
extra symbol transmissions, where n' = , and rj is the number of symbols of the jth round of extra 
transmission by the JERT scheme. 
 
 
 
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Simulations have been performed in Matlab to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed scheme. Unless specified 
otherwise, our simulations were set up with the following parameters: We randomly place N = 400 nodes on a 
square area of 1,000 m by 1,000 m. The radio transceiver range is 100 m. The MDS code is assumed to be (n; k) 
= (1;023;255). We investigate the performance of the JERT scheme and other related schemes. These schemes 
include the Incremental Redundancy Transmission (IRT) scheme,
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 the SP scheme, the H-M scheme proposed 
by Huang and Mehdi [13], and the scheme proposed by Chan et al. [2]. In our discussions, we vary γ for the SP 
scheme instead of changing (n; k) for the JERT scheme. 
 
6.1 Path Availabilities 
In Fig. 3, we demonstrate the need for multihop paths to connect two physical neighbors. In this figure, we 
present the probability of connecting two physical neighbors ps with up to one-hop, two-hop, three-hop, and 
four-hop paths for increasing the local connectivity plocal.. When we only include one-hop paths, ps = plocal. As 
we include paths with more hops, the connectivity probability increases and approaches 1 when plocal 
increases. For example, when plocal. = 0:5, up to two-hop paths can connect about 80 percent of the physical 
neighbors. However, we can connect about 97 percent and 99 percent of the physical neighbors when we use up 
to three-hop and four-hop paths, respectively. 
 
In Fig. 4, we show the number of paths with secure connections that are exactly h hops from a source to a 
destination (assuming that they do not share a common key). The average number of paths is presented, corre-
sponding to various plocal.. We also present the number of paths for a similar network with half the nodes (N = 
200) for comparison purposes. As shown in Fig. 4, the number of available paths increases with the local 
connectivity plocal.. When the node density increases, there are more paths as well. The number of h-hop paths 
also increases with h. Note that these paths may have common nodes other than the source and the destination. 
 
We show the number of node-disjoint paths in Fig. 5. Note that we chose two-hop paths first and then 
eliminated all other paths with nodes that have appeared in the previously counted paths. The total available 
node-disjoint paths are rather limited, as shown in Fig. 5. One interesting observation based on Fig. 5 is that the 
number of exactly h-hop node-disjoint paths decreases as h increases after 3. This could be due to our path 
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 The IRT scheme is an early version of the JERT scheme [29]. The IRT scheme uses all two-hop and three-hop paths, including 
those with common routers. Another major difference between the IRT and the JERT schemes is that the JERT scheme sends different 
fractions of symbols through different paths, whereas the IRT scheme always sends qj =1/m for all available paths. 
selection process and the larger number of nodes needed in h-hop node-disjoint paths in the neighborhood of the 
source and the destination when h is larger. 
 
The total number of node-disjoint routes from a source toward a destination is shown in Fig. 6. Based on this 
figure, it can be concluded that the available node-disjoint paths increases with plocal and N. An example of these 
results is that when plocal = 0:6 and N = 800, there are roughly six node-disjoint paths. Note that the JERT 
scheme uses all the available node-disjoint routes from a source toward a destination. When the number of such 
routes is larger, the JERT scheme can tolerate more compromised routes. 
 
In order to gain more insight on the neighbors of the source node serving in the node-disjoint multihop secure 
paths, we investigated the probability of secure neighbors serving in the transmission paths Pt and showed the 
results in Fig. 7. Since the insecure neighbors will not serve in the transmission paths, we only count the secure 
neighbors. As shown in Fig. 7, Pt increases with plocal. This can be explained by the better chances of finding 
other secure neighbors toward the destination. As N increases, there are more nodes in a neighborhood as well, 
leading to an increasing Pt. Therefore, under normal circumstances, the serving probability is from 0.4 to 0.7, 
depending on the node density and plocal. When nodes have a relatively large number of secure neighbors, they 
will be able to find enough node-disjoint multihop paths. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Transmission Overhead 
When there are compromised nodes on the paths used to deliver the secret link key information and these 
compromised nodes modify the passing information, extra symbols need to be transmitted. Fig. 8 shows the 
expected number of symbols that need to be transmitted in order to allow the destination to regenerate the secret 
key. We use all the available node-disjoint paths in the JERT scheme. The SP scheme randomly chooses one 
out of these paths to send the secret link key. The number of transmitted symbols in the SP scheme lowers as γ 
decreases. Therefore, the relative transmission cost of the JERT scheme, as compared with the SP scheme, 
increases as γ decreases. Note that there is a slight increase in the number of transmitted symbols in the JERT 
and the SP schemes as the node-compromised probability x increases. This is due to the higher probability of 
the used paths being compromised, and retransmissions may be needed. 
 
For comparison purposes, the number of symbols that are transmitted in the H-M scheme [13] is also shown in 
Fig. 8. Since an MDS code of (n; k) = (1;023;255) was used, the H-M scheme sends 255 x (4 + 1) = 1;275 
symbols while only tolerating up to two compromised paths. The JERT scheme with (1,023,255) code, 
however, can tolerate up to five compromised paths when the total number of paths is 12. Although it ensures 
the detection and correction of up to a higher number of faulty paths, the H-M scheme operates with a higher 
transmission cost. Note that the difference in cost of the JERT and H-M schemes changes with the selection of n 
and k. 
 
Numerical results based on (22) and (25) are also presented in Fig. 8. These results match well with our 
simulation results. 
 
In Fig. 9, we compare the extra symbol transmission of the JERT scheme and a related scheme suggested by 
Chan et al. [2]. In this scheme, a reinforcement technique is used to make sure that the adversary needs to 
compromise all paths in order to obtain the key. For fair comparison, the extra symbol transmission of the 
scheme is calculated based on sending keys through e + 1 paths. Note that JERT performs additional 
transmission when it is necessary such that the computational cost of JERT depends on the number of 
compromised paths between the source and the destination. In this figure, the extra computational cost of JERT 
has been converted to equivalent extra symbol transmissions and added to the results (see (27)). According to 
this figure, the extra symbol transmission of the JERT scheme is much smaller than that of the scheme given in 
[2]. 
6.3 Security Performance 
The flexibility of the secret-disclosure probability of the JERT scheme is presented in Fig.10. In this figure, we 
vary the value of a and show the secret-disclosure probability px for different node-compromised probabilities x. 
It can be observed that the JERT scheme has a much lower px than the SP scheme when α < 1. As α increases 
within the range between 0 and 1, the px value is smaller. For a fixed γ, α may be lowered by increasing k and n. 
Therefore, the JERT scheme provides a nice property of flexibility: a predefined threshold of the probability of 
secret key disclosure can be guaranteed by varying (n; k). The numerical results of (18) and (19) are compared 
with the simulation results in Fig. 10 as well. The numerical results (curves) match with the simulation results 
(symbols) quite well. 
 
We present the secret disclosure probability from another angle in Fig. 11, where we show px as a function of a 
for different x. The stepped curves shown in Fig. 11 suggest that px has some abrupt changes when a varies. 
This is because each path sends an integer number of symbols, and when one path is compromised, all these 
symbols are disclosed. Thus, the ratio of disclosed symbols is not continuous when α varies. When this value is 
compared with a secret ratio, step functions may appear. 
 
In Fig. 12, we compare the expected number of transmitted symbols in the JERT scheme, the IRT scheme, and 
another related scheme termed JERTe. The JERTe scheme is similar to the JERT scheme, except that qj = 1/m 
for all paths. The performance of the JERTe scheme is presented to show the effectiveness of the technique of 
sending different amounts of symbols to paths of different lengths. Based on Fig. 12, we conclude that the JERT 
scheme outperforms the IRT and JERTe schemes with much lower transmission cost. We can further conclude 
that the selection of qj has major effects on transmission overhead in the JERT scheme. 
 
We present the secret-disclosure probability of the JERT, IRT, and JERTe schemes in Fig. 13. In order to 
distinguish the performance of different schemes, we artificially increased y to 128 and 192. Such values of γ 
result in higher secret- disclosure probabilities. Based on Fig. 13, it can be concluded that the JERT scheme 
outperforms the IRT and JERTe schemes with lower secret-disclosure probability.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Key predistribution techniques for security provision of WSNs have attracted significant interests recently. One 
class of such key predistribution schemes loads a relatively small number of keys randomly chosen from a large 
key pool prior to deployment. After being deployed, each sensor tries finding common keys with its direct 
neighbors to establish link keys. Such link keys will then be used to protect the wireless communication 
between themselves. Due to the randomness of the key selection process, some neighboring sensors do not 
share any common key. In order to establish a link key among such neighbors, a multihop secure path may be 
used to deliver the secret. Such a delivery technique, however, renders several security problems such as secret 
information being disclosed and secret information being modified or dropped when some sensors are 
compromised by the adversary. 
 
In this paper, we have proposed and investigated the JERT scheme for the secret link key establishment process 
of key predistribution techniques. The JERT scheme uses the powerful MDS codes to encode the secret link key 
information and send the code words through multiple multihop paths. It provides a nice “Just-Enough” 
property: the redundant symbols are transmitted only when they are needed to enable the destination to decode 
the secret information. This feature reduces the transmission cost and provides extra protection of the secret 
information against disclosure. Furthermore, the JERT scheme has the salient feature of its flexibility of trading 
transmission for lower information disclosure. 
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